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"'Always historicize'. On the ethical and political implications of a 'historical' approach 
in the context of truth commissions and historical commissions"   
Berber Bevernage (Ghent University) 
Introduction 
According to the Dutch historian Antoon de Baets there are five basic strategies to deal with 
legacies of 'historical' injustice: forgetting, denying, explaining, purging and prosecuting.
1
 In 
this paper I want to focus on another important socio-cultural mechanism for dealing with 
legacies of violent conflict which is seldom analyzed or recognized: a mechanism which one 
could describe as 'consigning to history', 'declaring to be past' or 'historicization'.  
About this mechanism of 'historicization' I will argue that (1) it cannot be reduced to an issue 
of 'explaining' or 'understanding'; (2) it is a mechanism which is often used for dealing with 
historical injustices by both historians and other social actors; (3) it can have profound ethical 
and political implications; (4) it can be important or even indispensable for historians as well 
as for society at large, but it can also turn against the pursuit of justice; (5) it can never be 
legitimated merely on the basis of 'historical' arguments and should therefore never be 
considered as the exclusive or privileged domain of historians.  
In the first part of the paper I will analyze the manner in which the technique and especially 
the ethics of 'historicization' is often presented by historians. In order to illustrate this I will 
mainly focus on the work of the French historian Henry Rousso and the Dutch historian Bob 
de Graaff. In the second part of my the paper I will argue for a radically different 
interpretation of the ethics and politics of 'historicization'. In order to do so I will focus on a 
series of practical examples taken from my own research.  Finally, I will reflect on the 
question of how historians can engage the legacies of collective violence and injustice.  
 
II. Historicizing: Rousso and De Graaff 
 
The proper time of humanism 
There is a long and honorable tradition which attributes to historians the emancipatory 
potential to resist both the tyranny of the past over the present as well as the totalitarian 
dominance of the present over past and future. Historians can do this, it is said, by mapping 
out and demonstrating the fundamental differences between past and present.    
One prominent member of this intellectual tradition is Henry Rousso. According to Rousso 
the métier of the historian results in a liberating type of thinking, because it rejects the idea 
                                                          
1
 Antoon de Baets, "Na de genocide: Waarheidsstrategieën van rechters en historici", Tijdschrift voor 
Geschiedenis 116, no. 2 (2003), 2: 212-230, 212. De Baets himself refers to Timothy Garton Ash as a source of 




that people or societies are conditioned by their past without any possibility of escaping it.The 
historian can do this because, in contrast to the 'activist of memory' or the devotees of the 
'religion of memory', he or she only brings the past into the present in order to demonstrate the 
fundamental 'distance' that separates these two realities.
2
 While 'activists of memory' ignore 
the 'hierarchies of time' and do not seem to grasp the distance between past and present, 
historians observe the past where it belongs [‘à sa place’] and are conscious of the fact that 
they do so from the present, where they belong [‘notre place’]. One could paraphrase 
Rousso's argument as follows: the good historian inherently is an emancipator, because by 
measuring time he knows what is contemporary/actual and what is past or over and because 
he also knows what is their 'proper timing.' Proper because historians can correctly measure 
this timing, and proper because it is consider ethically responsible to do so            
The same plea for a proper relation to time and timing also plays a prominent role in Rousso's 
famous refusal to function as an expert witness in the Holocaust trial of Maurice Papon.
3
 The 
problem with this trail, which took place several decades after the facts, according to Rousso, 
was the great distance in time. Due to this distance, it tended to apply a 'presentist' ethical 
perspective to the historical events and become a trial of memory rather than a normal judicial 
process. In the context of the plea for a historiography that liberates the present by putting the 
past at a distance and by rejecting the 'religion of memory' it is significant that Philippe Petit 
writes about Rousso that he became a contemporary historian to 'accept the irreparable.'
4
 
The Dutch historian Bob de Graaff -- known for his participation in the research team that 
was commissioned by the Dutch government to scrutinize Dutch responsibilities in the 
Srebrenica massacre -- holds similar ideas about the ethical value of historiography. He too, 
considers the historian to be an expert of proper times and timing and draws a contrast 
between the historian on one hand and(genocidal) victims and survivors on the other.  For 
victims and survivors according to De Graaff, the difference between past and present is 
vague and they live in a synchronic rather than diachronic time or even live in an 'extra-
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  He refers to holocaust victims for whom, he claims, the "past remains present," 
and to whom it seems as if atrocities "only happened yesterday or even today". The task of 
historians, in contrast, is to place events, even genocidal ones, in their time; literally 
historicizing them. Historians have to do this by trying to "determine the individual character 
of particular epochs and by that demarcate one epoch vis-à-vis the other." As De Graaff puts 
it: "the historian historicizes" in the sense of "closing an epoch by recognizing its entirely 
individual/particular character." The historian recognizes the fact that the past can be "called 
up" again, but in contrast to the survivor he does this voluntarily. Moreover, he also 
"registers" that facts of the past are "bygone", "definitely lost" or have "come to a downfall."  
 
Good historiography is therefore, according to De Graaff, the antidote for resentment. Much 
like Rousso, De Graaff considers the professional duty of the historian socially desirable: to 
"draw a line under victimhood." Sooner or later our gaze has to be redirected from the past to 
the future.  De Graaff therefore approvingly cites the literary author Hellema that: "it has 
become about time ['hoog tijd'] to put the past in its place." 
 
I have long shared this vision of Rousso and De Graaff. It can hardly be doubted that the skill 
or habitus of historians forms an essential part of our critical thought and that, especially in 
these times of crisis or better crisis of time, it is potentially of great importance. Haven't we 
all started to feel uncertain about the borders separating present and past? Have we as 
historians and as citizens not collectively lost our ability to measure time and recognize or 
acknowledge the difference between 'today,' 'yesterday' and 'the day before yesterday;' and 
with that are we still able to distinguish between when we may hold on to things and try to 
intervene and when it is  time for a more contemplative attitude?   
 
Times of crisis/crises of time 
Times seem in many ways in crisis. On a social level, the temporal borders between what is 
contemporary/actual and what is past were until recently still to an important extent codified 
by socially prescribed periods of mourning.
6
 Classic prescriptions on terms of mourning, 
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however, have recently become faint in many modern societies. Many intellectuals report 
with dismay that, certainly in relation to massive violence, we should no longer take for 
granted that time heals all wounds.
7
 These intellectuals posit that pain has no "expiry date" 
and that "everything passes by except for the past"
8
 Neither politicians seem to be able to 
point to the shortest road to the future on the basis of their political agenda: they seem to need 
a long and toilsome detour via the painful past of historical injustices to reach something that 
resembles a project for the future.
9
  
According to historian Charles Maier something is thoroughly wrong with politics in the 
Western world, which might even stand at the end of an age. For example, Maier speaks of 
‘the end, or at least the interruption, of the capacity to found collective institutions that rest on 
aspiration for the future’ and he directly relates this phenomenon to an "obsession" with 
memory and a swift rise of a melancholic relation to the past.
10
 To put it briefly: would it not 
be good if historians could, on the basis of their scientific contemplation, still point out the 
precise temporal demarcations separating present, future and past. If they thus could still tell 
with certainty when social, cultural and political phenomena turn from present into past?     
 
III. Historicizing and transitional justice: constraints and risks  
I dwell upon this point because I am not convinced  that this would amount to a desirable type 
of knowledge. Let us return once more to Rousso's plea to study the past where it belongs [i.e. 
in the past] and from where we [historians/contemporaries] belong and to De Graaff's citation 
that "it [is] about time to put the past in its place." I want to raise three questions on this issue:   
The first thing to ask Rousso and De Graaff is whether historians can simply 'observe' the 
borders between past and present and thereby, in Rousso's words,  determine the place where 
they belong  on the one hand and the place where their subject of study belongs on the other 
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(e.g. academic historiography, the archive, the historical museum, etc). Can we claim to 
‘know’ the proper place of the past or is this place rather the product of an act of 'putting in its 
place' and thus constituted performatively?
11
  
     
This question may seem sophistic. However, since the historical present can never be reduced 
to a single point in time its definition will always, as French historian Jacques Le Goff notes, 
remain a basic problem for historians, whether they recognize this or not. The definition of the 
present, Le Goff argues, is always bound up with ideology.
12
  
This is certainly the case in truth commissions which are created in contexts of profound 
political, social and cultural transitions. In the context of transitions the borders between 
present and past are often vague. Because truth commissions make up an important part of 
these transitions, I have previously argued that truth commissions should not be considered as 
mechanisms which merely reflect on the past retrospectively but rather as actively 
constituting and regulating the categories of past and present.
13
 The use of historical discourse 
in truth commissions and in so-called 'new' democracies in general form a part of a broader 
politics of time and historicity in which these countries attempt to exorcise the ghosts of the 
past by actively positing what belongs to their (judicial, political, social, cultural, etc.) present 
and what cannot or should not be considered part of this present. Historical discourse 
establishes what can be considered 'timely' or part of actuality and what should be considered 
anachronistic, old, 'over' or "'definitely lost' or "downfallen." In order to understand this 
phenomenon and its important political and social effects, I advocate an analysis which 
interprets the use of historical discourse in transitional justice not just as a type of constative 
language, but also as a type of performative language..
14
 I agree with the French historian 
Michel de Certeau when he claims that the differentiating division between past and present is 
not merely an absolute axiom of historiography but even the result of an 'act of separation' [le 
geste de deviser] which conditions the very possibility of (modern, Western) historiography.
15
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De Certeau has a point when he argues that the idea of a strict division between present and 
past, which most historians take for granted, is founded on a socio-political logic and in its 
turn has important political implications. The following citation about the practice of 
historiography also holds true for the use of historical discourse in truth commissions:  
 Within a socially stratified reality, historiography defined as ‘past’ (that is, as an 
 ensemble of alterities and of ‘resistances’ to be comprehended or rejected) 
 whatever did not belong to the power of producing a present, whether the power is 
 political, social, or scientific. (...) Historical acts transform contemporary documents 
 into archives, or make the countryside into a museum of memorable and/or 
 superstitious  traditions. Such acts determine an opposition which circumscribes a 
 ‘past’ within a given society (...).16 
 
Our knowledge on the general efficiency of the use of historical discourse in truth 
commissions is limited.  
While historical discourse might help transitional countries in their search for social closure, it 
can also introduce an 'allochronist' practice (a term from Johannes Fabian): in transitional 
countries one often finds a tendency to (symbolically) allocate into another time or treat as 
living anachronism those people who refuse to participate in the process of reconciliation or 
nation building.  
In South Africa and Sierra Leone for example, one often represents forgiveness and 
reconciliation as defining characteristics of the present while rancor and revenge are 
represented as belonging to the past. Due to this tendency people who do not want or are 
not able to forgive or reconcile are often considered as not fully 'contemporaneous' with the 
rest of the nation. A similar mechanism is at play, for example, in Demond Tutu's famous 
slogan 'no future without forgiveness.17 A powerful formula, because it implicitly accuses 
those unwilling to forgive not merely of obstructing one specific future but the future in 
general -- as if they threatened to bring time itself to a standstill. 
Kader Asmal, one of the intellectual fathers of the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC), similarly hoped that this commission would bring 'proper historical 
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consciousness' to those who clung to the past. After the TRC, he argues, only ‘ahistoric 
hermits’ could still deny the new reality, ‘looking backwards at ghosts, unaware of the 
exorcism so decisively under way’. 18  The allochronic property of modern historical discourse 
allows Asmal to pose the following rhetorical question: 
 Exactly where (and when) are those few people living who still carry the old South 
 African flag to sporting events in the new South Africa? Where (and when) are those 
 (...) living, still oblivious that the old H. F. Verwoerd dam (...) is now called the 
 Garieb in honour of the area’s inhabitants. Where (and when) are  those people 
 living  (...) What time are some of us living (...)?19 
Besides the allochronistic tendency described above, the use of historical discourse -- or 
more specifically the stress on the (quasi-spatial) separation between past and present -- can 
have two other negative effects which are each other's exact opposite: the first one can be 
described as a sort of 'temporal Manichaeism' which can lead to a 'hyper-moralism'; the 
other one can be described as 'temporal relativism which can lead to a 'hypo-moralism' or an 
incapacity to form ethical judgments. A criticism often formulated against truth commissions 
and historical commissions is that they pay little attention to the continuity of certain 
phenomena because they focus on a strictly delimited period of the past. Thus,  they do not 
sufficiently combine their retrospective focus with a critical analysis of the present.    
The South African historian Colin Bundy, for example, strongly criticized the TRC in his 
country because it, according to him, focused too strongly on the strictly delineated period of 
Apartheid, which it described as the 'beast of the past' while it hardly took notice of 
continuities with the periods before and after.
20
 Other commentators too deemed the strict 
focus of the truth commission a missed chance for a more critical analysis of the 'new' South 
Africa.
21
 The lack of a critical scrutiny of the present can indeed result in the emergence of an 
ethical double standard whereby a sometimes moralistic condemnation of past injustice is 
combined with inertia or even blindness to present injustices. Worse even, the past can even 
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come to function as a 'storehouse' for all evil, which consequently no longer seems part of the 
present, or in comparison with which contemporary evil seems to belong to the class of 
featherweights.  
When this is the case, a tendency toward 'temporal Manichaeism' emerges which unburdens 
the present by burdening the past and which could be described with the following formula: 
'the past is evil/evil is past.' Richard Wilson formulated such a critique, although without 
naming it so, against the South African TRC which he criticized for condemning violence of 
the past while identical violence still continued in prisons only a few miles away.
22
 The 
limited attention paid to the continuation of the past in the present and the related tendency 
toward temporal Manichaeism can partly be explained by referring to the specific political 
and ideological context in which most truth commissions function. Yet, the postulate of the 
division of past and present and the taboo on presentism that underpins the dominant currents 
of Western historiography also play a central role here. Temporal Manichaeism is moreover 
reinforced by a series of widespread tendencies in contemporary historiography which, as 
Pieter Lagrou appropriately remarks, increasingly focuses on horror and crime in the past and 
tends to evolve from a ‘histoire du temps présent’ [history of the present] into a ‘histoire des 
autres’ [history of the other].23  
Paradoxically the logic of historicization can also lead to a moral relativism and an incapacity 
for ethical judgment. This especially is the case when the absolute particularity and 
singularity of historical events and context are stressed.  In order to formulate an ethical 
judgment we are in need of a set of a-historical standards which transcends the case to be 
evaluated. A radical stress on the unicity of each historical situation can lead to a 'hypo-
moralism.'
24
 Most historians will not consider this a problem, but in the context of truth 
commissions and historical commissions this can be highly problematical. This certainly is 
the case if one agrees with Antoon De Baets, that even if historians qua historians should not 
judge, then at least their insights should enable others to do so in an informed way.
25
  
The problem of hypo-moralism by historicization has, for example, taken place in the 
parliamentary commission which had to inquire into the Belgian responsibility in the murder 
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on the first Congolese prime minister Patrice Lumumba. When writing their final report the 
Belgian MP's fell back on research that was done by a specially appointed team of expert-
historians and also took over the their taboo on 'presentism'. This taboo on presentism, or as 
the MP's put it, the fear to 'analyse and comment the facts from a present-day worldview', 
resulted in a great reluctance to formulate an ethical judgment among the politicians. This 
eventually lead to a situation in which the Belgian role in the murder of Lumumba was 
morally condemned in a nominal way, but whereby a series of disclaimers about the 
difference between 'norms concerning public morality of today' and 'personal moral 
considerations at that time' immediately 'defused' or even canceled this nominal condemnation 
on a political level.
26
  
For another example of hypo-moralism by historicization I want to turn for a moment to 
the Minority Position in which the Afrikaner member of the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC), Wynand Malan, turned against the conclusions, especially 
concerning the moral condemnation reprehensibility of Apartheid, which his colleague 
commissioners formulated in their final report. Malan criticizes the report of the TRC on a 
methodological plane because the commission, according to him, made too much use of oral 
history, a type of history which he regards as untrustworthy.  
   
More interestingly, however, he also set up a historiographic argument against what he 
considers to be the commissions all too moralist approach. He does this by interpreting the 
commission’s moralist approach as the result of the absence of a profound historical analysis 
or as he puts it: the lack of a ‘real historical evaluation’. Whoever engages in a 'real historical 
evaluation of Apartheid, according to Malan, cannot but recognize this existence of historical 
perspectivism: i.e. the fact that each historical phenomenon can become the subject of 
different legitimate perspectives which should all be integrated if one wants to arrive at a 
'shared history'. Malan therefore criticizes the fact that the TRC in its report, and in line with a 
previous decision of the UN, refers to Apartheid as a crime against humanity. For Malan this 
clearly is a continuation of an old historical narrative and a 'battle of the past' since the UN 
took this decision back in 1973 while Malan in line with his historicist approach stresses that 
‘moral imperatives are phenomena of their times and locations’.27  
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The appellation as crime against humanity has great practical importance because criminal 
prosecution then remains a possibility, due to the imperceptibility of that specific type of 
crime.   
Malan regrets that his colleague commissioners do not reject this and therefore implicitly 
argues that they are obsessed with the past. He poses the rhetorical question ‘whether an 
investigation of apartheid under international law would have any present or future legal or 
political value’. This possibly might have been the case if it concerned a genocide, because 
genocides remain a potential threat for many societies, but ‘apartheid as a system is dead and 
buried forever.’28 He therefore concludes that attempts to retroactively prosecute war crimes 




One might ask Rousso, de Graaff and Malan why  historians should have the authority to 'put 
in its place' or 'close off' something of such great weight as the past, and this merely on this 
basis of scientific contemplation. Would it not be worrying if historians would thereby only 
have to present their skill of measuring time? And what should we think of the relation 
between the professional duty of historians to historicizingly 'close off' epochs by 
demonstrating their 'entirely particular/typical character'
30
 and the social justification of this 
act of closure? Can these two actually be differentiated and if so, is it not often the case that 
historians tend to see closed, bygone or definitely 'lost' and clearly identifiable epochs where 
this is deemed socially desirable? Certainly historians dispose of a reasonable margin for 
demarcating one period in relation to the other. This margin makes it hard to speak about the 
'observing' or 'recognizing' of different epochs.   
I do not have the space here to elaborate on this issue, but it is  important to remark that 
several researchers have argued that historical periodisation, rather than merely being a 
heuristic device or merely resulting from scientific observation is often thoroughly political, 
primarily legitimating claims for autonomy and sovereignty. These researchers therefore 
speak about a ‘periodisation politics’.31 This politics of  periodisation is highly relevant in the 
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case of so-called transitional countries or new democracies who often base their national 
identity and international legitimacy on an (alleged) break with a dictatorial or violent past 
and thus on a 'discontinuous historicity.’32 The choice for a particular temporal demarcation is 




I want to return a last time to the citation that 'the time has come to put the past in its place' to 
raise a last question about it: how can one know that this time has come? Can a historian say 
something about such an inherently ethico-political or even quasi-religious question?
34
 Even 
when we are convinced that at some point in time a line has to be drawn under the past, does 
the central question not still remain at which point in time exactly this line has to be drawn?   
 
One can hardly deny that it is socially necessary to make a certain distinction between 
victimship and 'former victimship' as de Graaf suggested.  The same seems to be true for the 
distinction between perpetratorship and 'former perpetratorship as well. The question, however, is 
whether this distinction between victims or perpetrators and former victims or perpetrators 
isn't primarily an ethico-political difference, instead of a historical or chronological one. 
When historians make this sort of demarcations they force us to make the leap from a 
chronological, descriptive time to an imperative, prescriptive time. Such a leap is problematic 
because each chronological moment can by appointed by anyone as the time to draw a line 
under the past -- by the 'good historian' as well as the perpetrator or the politician with less 
noble intentions. This indeed is the logic which underpins many pleas for amnesia and 
amnesty: a logic which posits that there will never be a more timely moment to draw a line 
under the past than the moment when it is still present. How then do we reassure ourselves 
that we are not prematurely closing off the past?
35
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On previous occasions I have referred to the so-called Documento Final issued in 1983 by the 
Argentine military Junta as a perfect example of this perverted use of the logic of 
historicization for prematurely closing of the past.
36
  
Although the Documento Final was essentially concerned with self-amnestying, and although 
the propaganda piece was televised during the military dictatorship and before the transition 
to democracy, it was conceived as historical documentary. The military leaders referred to the 
piece as a 'historical synthesis of the painful and still nearby past'. The viewer gets to hear that 
'the moment has come to heal the wounds [...] to enter with a Christian spirit to the dawning 
of a new epoch, and to look with humility to the day of tomorrow.' 
At the end of the documentary the military leaders proclaim the end of the dirty war and grant 
themselves an extensive amnesty. The entire document can be seen as a drama of closure 
which has to lead to one central conclusion: that the dirty war was bitter, but that now it is 
history and the nation should look forward to better times. It is clear that many (ex-)dictators 
and war criminals are suspiciously fond of making us of historical discourse.  
 
The issue of the proper time to close off the past is not restricted to the perverse or cynical 
cases of self-amnestying however. Hamber and Wilson remark that governments often want 
to close off pasts far earlier than the individuals involved are willing or able to do: ‘For 
survivors, the state’s desire to build a new post-conflict society often means sloughing off the 
past too easily, and asking survivors to engage in a premature closure before all the 
psychological processes of truth and recompense are fully internalised.’37  
It is therefore important that chronology or the fact that events belong to the chronological 
past are not instrumentalized as an alibi for claiming that these events also belong to the past 
in a more substantive sense, that they are passé or history in the pejorative sense. This is the 
danger that often lurks in the use of historical discourse by truth commissions.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Zij stellen dat overheden na periodes van dictatuur of gewelddadig conflict vaak veel sneller een soort afsluiting 
of ‘closure’ van het verleden nastreven dan individuele slachtoffers kunnen of willen aanvaarden: "For survivors, 
the state’s desire to build a new post-conflict society often means sloughing off the past too easily, and asking 
survivors to engage in a premature closure before all the psychological processes around truth and recompense 
are fully internalised." Brandon Hamber & Richard Wilson, "Symbolic closure through memory, reparation and 
revenge in post-conflict societies", Journal of Human Rights 1, no. 1 (2002), 35-53. 
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The mechanisms of the politics of time described above do not remain uncontested 
however. In South Africa for example the Khulumani Support Group -- a member 
organisation which represents over 55.000 victims and survivors of Apartheid violence –  
very explicitly criticize the politics of time used by both the TRC as well as the ANC-
government. They criticize the 'unfinished business' of the TRC and the ‘folly to think that the 
demand for accountability will fade with time’. ‘It is not perpetrators who should be 
announcing that it is time to move on from the horrors of a past that continues to live in the 
present,’ they argue, ‘it is victims who should announce that time.’ While they, do not reject 
the aims of nation building and reconciliation in principle, they ‘declare that the past is in the 
present’ and call on all South Africans to accept ‘that the past is not yet past’.38 
The most radical and fascinating resistance against the logic of historicization and 
against chronological notions of time can undoubtedly be found with the Argentine 
Asociación Madres de Plaza de Mayo.The Madres have a perfect insight into the functioning 
of historical discourse and its potential effects on the dealing with injustice. Because they fear 
that this logic of historicization will indirectly legitimize a situation of impunity, they 
radically resist each metaphor that refers to an absent, distant or dead past. The madres' best 
known strategy to do this is their stress on the ghostlike figure of the desaparecidos 
(disappeared) who are neither alive not fully dead and who blur the borders between past and 
present. Despite the more than thirty calendar years that have 'passed' since the disappearance 
of their children the Madres deny the 'pastness' of this event.
39
     
 
Conclusion 
The debate about the possibilities, limitations and desirability of the contribution of historians 
and historiography to transitional justice up to now has primarily focused on the aspects of 
'truth' and the contrast between remembrance and forgetting. Both the proponents as well as 
the opponents of the use of history in the context of transitional justice have primarily focused 
on the tenability of popular transitional justice-claims about the reconciliation by truth telling 
and about remembrance as an alternative form of justice and have therefore conceived the use 
of historiography in terms of a search for 'objective truth' or as struggle against 'forgetting'. 
This approach is important and also yields a number of very interesting questions. The focus 
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on the dimensions of the process of establishing truth and the tension between remembrance 
of forgetting remain limited if one wants to understand the ethical implications of the use of 
history in transitional justice and in Vergangenheitsbewältigung in general.   
One should also pay attention to another aspect of the relation between historiography and 
transitional justice: that of the politics of time as it manifests itself in the practice of 
historicizing. The role of historiography and historical discourse within the field of 
transitional justice should not merely be related to its traditional functions of representing the 
past, of searching for truth or even of generating meaning or identity, but also to its concept of 
time and the specific way in which it conceptualizes the relation between present and past.  
Historical discourse and the logic of historicization can be attractive in the context of 
transitional justice and truth commissions because of its ambivalent tendency to divide 
present and past merely by 'diagnosing' its 'division', in other words its alleged capacity to put 
the past in its place simply by recognizing or acknowledging this place. While the logic of 
historicizing can be of great importance in dealing with historical injustice, it can also have a 
series of negative consequences. For example, it can tend towards hyper-morality as well as 
hypo-morality and can be abused to prematurely close off the past or even legitimize 
impunity. 
Does this mean that I see not ethical mandate for historians and think that historians should 
not engage with transitional justice or truth and historical commissions at all? No, they 
certainly should because historical discourse and the logic of historicization are already  used 
in transitional justice without historians being present. Historians can and even should play an 
important ethical role but primarily an indirect one. They should not claim that they can solve 
complex ethical or political dilemmas simply on the basis of their expertise in measuring time 
and determine the 'hierarchy of time'. In that case chronology would indeed serve as an alibi 
for escaping ethico-political responsibilities. Historians can, however, play a critical role 
precisely by reflexively pointing out the use and abuse of historical discourse and politics of 
time in such a way that ethical and political dilemmas are sharpened and the need for taking 
responsibility is made manifest. 
